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Abstract: Here we highlight the contribution that private creditors have made to resolve 
expeditiously and even generously the many sovereign debt crises in which they have 
been involved. The road from debt restructuring to debt forgiveness – from reprofiling to 
cancellation, in the jargon of the official community – has been a fairly short one for 
commercial banks and bondholders, but a very long one for the official export-credit and 
foreign-aid agencies represented by the Paris Club, as well as for the multilateral 
agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF. They have yet to grant any debt 
reduction to the middle-income countries that were the object of bailouts during the 
1990s and the recipients of subsequent debt relief from the private sector, and they have 
moved far too slowly to address the needs of the poorest countries, many of which have 
received substantial, upfront and unconditional debt forgiveness from private creditors. 
 
 
During the 1990s and earlier this decade, certain academic scribblers on both 
sides of the Atlantic, plus policymakers in Washington, London, and beyond, 
flogged the idea that the functioning of the world’s financial markets had to be 
improved, by making it easier for governments in unstable emerging markets to 
obtain debt relief from their private creditors in times of financial distress. A 
variety of proposals envisaged creating a new legal regime for sovereign 
bankruptcy, achieved through an international treaty buttressed by amendments 
to existing national bankruptcy codes. It would empower a supranational entity to 
render Solomonic judgments about the illiquidity or insolvency of sovereigns, 
overriding all outstanding loan and bond contracts.1
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The best known of these was the Orwellian construct of a supranational 
“Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism” (SDRM) to operate under the aegis 
of the International Monetary Fund, which was conceived in 2001 and was 
subsequently modified during 2002-03 by a self-serving IMF.2 In the face of 
universal criticism from private-sector lenders and investors, and also from 
leading emerging-market governments such as Mexico’s, the proposal ultimately 
failed to attract the requisite political support from the U.S. and others. Besides, 
at the time the world economy was looking up and no new sovereign disasters – 
at least not with systemic implications – appeared to be in the making. Argentina, 
which had defaulted at the end of 2001 despite having received good marks and 
huge loans from the IMF, was eschewing the traditional, collaborative approach 
and was crafting its own, unilateral restructuring of debt obligations. Lastly, the 
threat of an SDRM coming to pass was persuading investors and sovereign 
issuers alike to introduce new collective-action clauses into bond contracts, with 
the goal of facilitating future debt restructurings. 
 
The ostensible rationale for all the brainstorming on the part of policymakers and 
their academic consultants was to ameliorate the supposedly undesirable 
consequences of having bailed out, during the 1990s, a number of troubled 
sovereign debtors (e.g., Mexico in 1995 and various Asian countries, Brazil and 
                                                                                                                                                 
1 See Kenneth Rogoff and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, “Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns: A 
History of Ideas, 1976-2001,” IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 49 #3 (2002), pp. 470-507. 
2 See Anne O. Krueger, A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring (Washington, D.C.: 
International Monetary Fund, April 2002); and Sean Hagan, “Designing a Legal Framework to 
Restructure Sovereign Debt,” Georgetown Journal of International Law, Winter 2005, pp. 299-
402. 
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Russia in 1997-98). Stung by criticism of having encouraged reckless investors 
and overindebted countries to come knocking at their door pleading for 
truckloads of money, the U.S. and other governments reportedly wanted to open 
up an alternative – a fast track to default, debt forgiveness, and financial 
resurrection. Thus, when in the future a government under financial duress came 
looking for massive financial help, it would no longer be able to claim that the 
only alternative to a bailout was a hopelessly disruptive, delayed, and uncertain 
default with potential spillover effects around the globe. With some kind of 
sovereign bankruptcy process in place, Washington and its G7 partners would 
feel free to tell that government that it should seek debt relief from its private 
creditors, availing itself of the supposedly quick, orderly and painless debt-
restructuring mechanism. 
 
A more cynical interpretation of all this intellectual and policymaking brouhaha is 
that, during the 1990s and earlier this decade, the US and its Canadian, 
European and Japanese partners purposely kicked up the SDRM storm – to 
divert public attention from their own reluctance to accept loan losses and grant 
debt forgiveness, whether to overindebted middle-income nations or to the 
poorest countries in the world. To this day, the official export-credit and foreign-
aid agencies represented by the Paris Club, as well as the multilateral agencies 
(such as the World Bank and the regional development banks – never mind the 
IMF), have yet to grant any debt cancellation to the middle-income countries that 
were the object of bailouts during the 1990s and the recipients of subsequent 
 3
debt forgiveness from the private sector.3 As concerns debt reduction in low-
income countries (via the HIPC Initiative of 1996, as enhanced in 1999 and 
supplemented by the MDRI in 2005), it has taken a full decade for not even 20 
countries to reach the so-called completion point at which they finally get the debt 
forgiveness committed to them previously.4 Consequently, dozens of exceedingly 
poor countries remain burdened with unsustainable debts that tie up the 
budgetary resources needed to fund poverty reduction initiatives. 
Indeed, in the wake of the punishing, unilateral debt restructuring by Argentina 
that three quarters of its bondholders were compelled to swallow in 2005, a case 
can be made that, if anything, international reforms should focus on making 
contracts easier to enforce by paring back the protections sovereign debtors are 
currently afforded, for example under the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act.5 The main reason corporations that cannot pay their creditors subject 
themselves to wrenching, court-supervised reorganizations is because the 
frightening alternative is their outright liquidation. Sovereign governments, in 
contrast, do not operate under the threat of liquidation, and despite the strong 
rights that private creditors have on paper (under New York, British and other 
law), practical experience – reinforced by the ongoing case of Argentina – proves 
                                                 
3 As discussed below, in a handful of unique cases of political importance to the U.S. (involving 
Egypt, Iraq, Poland and the former Yugoslavia), and in the recent case of Nigeria, the Paris Club 
did grant various levels of debt forgiveness, but none of the countries involved had been the 
object of a massive bailout. 
4 See Development Committee of the World Bank and IMF, “Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
Initiative (HIPC) and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI): Status of Implementation,” 
September 7, 2006, available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEVCOMMINT/Documentation/21046514/DC2006-0016(E)-
HIPC.pdf.  
 4
that the enforcement of claims against sovereign governments is exceedingly 
difficult. Whereas delinquent corporations can be hauled, de jure and de facto, 
before a bankruptcy court and be forced to change management, restructure 
operations, dispose of assets, or even liquidate to pay off claims, governments 
are not subjected to any of that. Much as the storybook child who blurted out the 
truth about his Emperor being naked, a rogue sovereign debtor like Argentina 
has single-handedly managed to undermine the integrity of the international 
financial system, exposing its inherent fragility for all to see.6
 
FROM THE MID-1950s TO THE LATE 1980s 
 
The road from debt restructuring to debt forgiveness – from reprofiling to 
cancellation, in the jargon of the official community – has been a fairly short one 
for private creditors but a very long one for the two kinds of government lenders: 
bilateral creditors, mainly export-credit and foreign-aid agencies (such as the 
U.S. Ex-Im Bank and AID, and their equivalents in other countries) and 
multilateral creditors, such as the World Bank, the regional development banks 
(e.g., the African, Asian, European, and Inter-American development banks) and 
the IMF. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 See Hal S. Scott, “Sovereign Debt Defaults: Cry for the United States, not Argentina,” 
Washington Legal Foundation Working Paper #140, September 2006, available at 
http://www.wlf.org/upload/Scott%20WP%20Final.pdf.  
6 See Arturo C. Porzecanski, “From Rogue Creditors to Rogue Debtors: Implications of 
Argentina’s Default,” Chicago Journal of International Law, Summer 2005, pp. 311-332. 
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It was in 1955 that six European countries decided to pursue a joint approach to 
clearing financial obligations that Brazil had built up with them, and they did so by 
meeting in The Hague. Within a year’s time, a similar gathering involving even 
more European countries took place in Paris, this time to deal with $500 million 
of Argentine debts coming due after the overthrow of the Juan Domingo Peron 
regime. While more than a decade would have to pass before France established 
an effective monopoly over the process of restructuring debt owed to government 
agencies (including newcomers Canada, Japan and the U.S., during the 1960s), 
what we now know as the Paris Club evolved as a pragmatic rather than a 
planned solution to the problem of overly burdensome sovereign debts.7
 
In the second half of the 20th century, the balance of payments deficits of the 
developing countries went from being financed mainly by government agencies 
in the industrialized countries to being underwritten largely by private-sector 
lenders and investors, mostly from those same industrialized countries. From the 
creation of the Paris Club until the mid-1970s, the main external financing flows 
were provided by official foreign aid and trade-credit agencies, or else by 
multilateral lenders such as the World Bank and the IMF. In this first phase, when 
developing countries encountered external financial problems, they would go to 
the IMF for assistance in the preparation and implementation of a stabilization 
program, which was underwritten by a short-term loan from the Fund, and then 
they would sit down with their bilateral creditors in Paris to work out debt relief 
                                                 
7 See Lex Rieffel, Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Case for Ad Hoc Machinery (Washington, 
DC: Brookings, 2003), pp. 56-94. 
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along what is known as “Classic” terms. Credits previously granted by foreign aid 
and export credit agencies were rescheduled at market interest rates with a 
principal repayment profile negotiated on a case-by-case basis. The loans made 
by multilateral agencies were not similarly restructured, as they were granted de 
facto top seniority in the chain of cross-border payments. Private creditors 
(mainly banks and suppliers) were often unaffected because of their limited 
exposure to these developing countries. 
 
Chart 1: External financing to all developing countries ($ billions) 
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Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance, various issues. 
 
From the mid-1970s to date, however, private-sector lenders and investors – 
commercial banks at first, then bondholders and equity investors – have 
underwritten all but the poorest and most mismanaged developing countries (see 
Chart 1). When commercial banks were the largest providers of external finance 
(from the mid-1970s until the early 1990s) and a country found itself in financial 
difficulties, it would likewise turn to the IMF for guidance and financial support – 
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but then it would sit down with its commercial bank creditors to work out a 
mutually acceptable debt rescheduling. These meetings would largely take place 
either in New York (involving Latin American countries) or in London (involving 
Eastern European, Middle Eastern and African countries) – giving rise to the term 
“London Club” for another ad hoc process of debt negotiations that would be 
refined through time.8 The Paris Club would then chime in with a debt 
restructuring along its Classic terms, and the multilateral agencies would pledge 
substantial new lending in lieu of any reprofiling of their existing loans.  
 
FROM THE LATE 1980s TO DATE 
 
In the late 1980s, however, after a number of countries (particularly in Latin 
America) had gone through multiple debt restructuring exercises which still left 
them overindebted, the U.S. government came up with what became known as 
the Brady Plan, named after the then U.S. Secretary of the Treasury. The 
commercial banks (London Club) were pressured into granting sizeable, 
permanent debt forgiveness, and to do so by exchanging existing loans for long-
term bonds issued by the developing countries, which incorporated either a 
reduction in the principal owed or below-market interest rates. The principal of 
these “Brady” bonds was often guaranteed and a rolling portion of the coupon 
payments was collateralized. To come up with the requisite collateral, the debtor 
governments would purchase high-quality securities (including zero-coupon 
bonds issued by the U.S. Treasury), supplementing their own resources when 
                                                 
TP
8 Rieffel, op. cit., pp. 95-131. 
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needed with loans from the IMF and the World Bank. In addition, the countries 
would commit to economic reforms underwritten in part by the multilateral 
agencies. Nevertheless, all of the debt forgiveness was granted upfront by the 
private creditors, and was neither conditioned on need as determined by the 
banks – the extent of debt relief was essentially dictated by the IMF – nor on 
ongoing, good performance on the part of the sovereign debtors. 
 
The Paris Club, in sharp contrast, did not grant any debt reduction to the 
countries that had obtained it from their commercial bank lenders under the 
Brady Plan, adhering to its usual debt reprofiling exercises. The only concession 
made, starting in late 1990, was to reschedule the obligations of lower middle-
income countries under so-called Houston terms, featuring longer repayment 
periods and lower interest rates on foreign aid loans. Among the Brady Plan 
beneficiary countries that obtained said Houston terms during the early 1990s 
were Ecuador, Morocco, Nigeria, Philippines and Peru. All of the largest debtors, 
such as Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, however, had their Paris Club debt 
restructured under ordinary, Classic terms. The multilateral lending agencies, for 
their part, did not engage in any debt restructuring, even in the face of some 
protracted defaults (e.g., on the part of Peru), preferring instead to underwrite the 
developing countries, as noted, by making new loans in support of 
creditworthiness-enhancing reforms and the purchase of high-grade securities to 
back the Brady bonds. 
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In April and May 1991, this time it was the Paris Club, also under pressure from 
the U.S. government, that was persuaded to make an exception and grant 
permanent debt forgiveness to two countries, the first of which would end up 
issuing Brady bonds: Poland (considered middle-income) and Egypt (lower 
middle-income). Both obtained a halving of their financial obligations to the Paris 
Club measured on a net-present-value (NPV) basis, namely, combining debt 
write-offs with interest payments set below the creditors’ cost of funds. The 
official rationale for this unprecedented gesture of financial support was that 
Poland had been of “strategic importance in the stabilization and transformation 
of Eastern European states to market-oriented democracies, and in recognition 
of the contribution of the Polish armed forces to the Allied victory in World War 
II,” and that Egypt had played an “important role in the consolidation of a Gulf 
War coalition to expel Iraq from Kuwait.”9  
 
In Poland’s case, the Paris Club, egged on by the United States, subsequently 
insisted that the Polish government obtain a comparable amount of debt 
forgiveness from its commercial bank creditors. The exposure of banks to Poland 
was half that of the Paris Club, but it was still quite large in absolute terms 
(almost $15 billion), and the London Club expressed strong reservations about 
this politicization of the debt restructuring process, particularly since the extent of 
debt forgiveness demanded seemed to be unwarranted. Three years later, 
                                                 
9 See U.S. Treasury, “US Debt Reduction Activities FY 1990 through FY 1999,” February 2000, 
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/debtreduct.pdf. The US government 
went beyond the Paris Club agreement and reduced 70 percent of Poland’s obligations plus 100 
percent of Egypt’s military debt. 
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however, the banks caved in to the political pressure and agreed to a very 
generous debt deal under the Brady Plan that was deemed acceptable by the 
Paris Club. The multilateral agencies, meantime, did not depart from their 
tradition and granted debt forgiveness neither to Egypt nor to Poland. 
 
In the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, in fact, Paris Club operations began 
to move down two separate avenues: the one we have detailed, applicable to 
middle-income or lower-middle-income countries, ineligible for debt forgiveness 
except in the two special cases just noted; and another applicable to the lowest-
income countries, which became eligible for progressively more generous 
amounts of debt reduction starting in late 1988. The reason official lenders 
moved down this second avenue is that mere reprofiling operations had 
exhausted the immediate cash-flow relief that could possibly be delivered to the 
poorest countries, and thus the creditors had to choose between increasing new 
commitments of foreign aid or agreeing to debt cancellation. Decisions on the 
extent of such forgiveness were made during various G7 summits, starting with 
one in Toronto in October 1988. “Toronto terms” authorized for the first time a 
reduction of one-third of the debt of poor countries, and 20 countries benefited 
from them between 1988 and 1991. In December 1991, Paris Club creditors 
agreed to implement a new treatment on the debt of the poorest countries along 
“London terms,” which raised the allowable level of debt cancellation to 50 
percent, and 23 countries benefited from these terms between 1991 and 1994. 
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In December 1994, the G7 governments agreed on still more debt forgiveness for 
lowest-income countries. These new “Naples terms” raised the potential 
cancellation level to 67 percent of eligible credits, and 35 countries had benefited 
from these terms through late 2006. In November 1996, in the framework of the 
initiative for “Heavily Indebted Poor Countries” (HIPC), the level of debt 
forgiveness was increased to 80 percent for the poorest countries with the 
highest indebtedness, and 5 countries qualified for these “Lyons terms.” Then, in 
November 1999, the Paris Club creditor countries, again within the framework of 
the HIPC initiative and in the aftermath of the Cologne Summit, accepted to raise 
the level of debt forgiveness up to 90 percent or more, and as of late 2006, 25 
countries had benefited from “Cologne terms.”10 Finally, in mid-2005, the G8 
gathering proposed that three multilateral institutions (the IMF, the International 
Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank, and the African Development 
Fund) prepare themselves to cancel 100 percent of their debt claims on countries 
that have reached, or will eventually reach, the completion point under the 
Enhanced HIPC (September 1999). 
 
However, progress on debt relief under the HIPC initiative has been painfully 
slow for two main reasons. First, official creditors have set eligibility criteria for 
debt cancellation according to evolving – and arguably incomplete and biased – 
standards as to what constitutes an unsustainable level of indebtedness. Initially, 
eligibility was based on two debt sustainability thresholds: the net present value 
                                                 
10 The factual information cited in this and the prior paragraph was obtained from the website of 
the Paris Club, available at 
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(NPV) of the public foreign debt had to be equivalent to more than 200 percent of 
annual exports, and yearly debt service had to represent at least 20 percent of 
export earnings. In the wake of the Enhanced HIPC, these eligibility standards 
were loosened – the NPV of the public external debt had to be greater than 150 
percent of exports – but the approach to debt sustainability did not change. 
Thresholds applicable to countries unusually open to foreign trade were likewise 
relaxed over time.11  
 
It took many years for the World Bank and the IMF to react to criticism and adopt, 
in 2005, a new debt sustainability framework – a more comprehensive and 
forward-looking calculation, but also one that is more prone to bias and error. 
The new approach includes a determination of country-specific debt thresholds 
that considers domestic as well as external indebtedness, and varies depending 
on the quality of policies and institutions; an evaluation of economic vulnerability 
to external shocks; and the existence of a borrowing strategy that minimizes the 
risk of debt distress. The new framework is nevertheless subject to criticism 
because of its reliance on a series of subjective judgments and economic 
projections (e.g., of debt repayment capacity, government revenues and export 
growth), which are prone to optimistic biases on the part of official creditors. After 
all, besides being effectively governed by the creditor nations, the Bank and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/presentation/presentation.php?BATCH=B02WP03.  
11 For countries with open economies (an export-to-GDP ratio greater than 40 percent) and 
substantial tax revenues (greater than 20 percent of GDP), having an NPV of public debt-to-tax 
revenues above 280 percent was an initial, alternative condition for eligibility. These thresholds 
were later lowered to above 30 percent (for exports-to-GDP), greater than 15 percent (for 
revenues-to-GDP), and above 250 percent (for debt-to-revenues). 
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IMF are creditors themselves to the poor countries, which results in debt relief 
needs allegedly “being regularly calculated at a lower level than necessary.”12
 
Second, official creditors have insisted that debt cancellation – no matter how 
badly needed – be conditioned on the application of stabilization measures and 
structural reforms over a period of many years. All that the Paris Club had 
expected of countries before granting them any debt relief was that they should 
have in place an agreement with the IMF specifying an agenda of stabilization 
and reform measures. The original HIPC initiative required countries not only to 
have successfully met the requirements of an IMF program for three years in 
order to reach the so-called decision point, but to remain in compliance for a 
further three years in order to reach the “completion point.” The Enhanced HIPC 
went beyond this to establish an additional conditionality: countries had to come 
up with a strategy for reducing poverty, including via higher government spending 
(as laid out in a “Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper” or PRSP), and had to begin 
implementing it between the decision and completion points, subject to 
IMF/World Bank monitoring. In sum, the timetable for progress was no longer 
limited to three years but, rather, was stretched out for many more years – it is 
now called a “floating timetable” – dependent on the nature and pace of progress 
                                                 
12 See Eurodad, To Repay or to Develop? Handbook on Debt Sustainability (Brussels: Eurodad, 
April 2006), p. 8, available at 
http://www.eurodad.org/uploadstore/cms/docs/HandbookEnglishfinal.pdf. See also Henry 
Northover, To Lend or to Grant? Critique of IMF/World Bank Approach to Debt Sustainability 
(London: CAFOD, April 2004), available at 
http://www.cafod.org.uk/var/storage/original/application/phphQhUd5.pdf; and Marco Arnone, Luca 
Bandiera and Andrea F. Presbitero, “External Debt Sustainability: Theory and Empirical 
Evidence,” draft, 2005, available at 
http://www3.unicatt.it/unicattolica/Dipartimenti/DISES/allegati/ArnoneBandieraPresbitero33.pdf.  
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as judged by the multilateral agencies. The conditionality attached to debt relief 
has thus become more comprehensive over time, and far more elaborate and 
subjective than envisaged by the original HIPC – never mind as practiced for 
many years by the Paris Club.13  
 
Recent economic research suggests that, contrary to the immediate, massive, 
and unconditional debt forgiveness granted by private creditors under the Brady 
Plan in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the piecemeal, delayed and highly 
conditional debt cancellation granted by official creditors in recent years has had 
little positive impact.14 One empirical study examined the economic performance 
of countries that have been the recipient of HIPC-related relief, versus those that 
have not been included in this debt cancellation initiative, and concluded that the 
                                                 
13 See Geske Dijkstra, “
 
Debt Relief from a Donor Perspective: The Case of the Netherlands,” in 
HIPC Debt Relief: Myths and Reality, ed. by Jan Joost Teunissen and Age Akkerman (The 
Hague: FONDAD, February 2004), pp. 109-131, available at 
http://www.fondad.org/publications/hipc/Fondad-HIPC-Chapter7.pdf. Slippage in the achievement 
of fiscal objectives, privatization targets and governance improvements are the most frequent 
causes of program delay or breakdown. See Jubilee Debt Campaign, Tightening the Chains or 
Cutting the Strings? The Status of HIPC Conditionality in 2006 (London: Jubilee Debt Campaign, 
September 2006), available at http://www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk/?lid=2341. On the 
unacceptably high and rising number of conditions that poor countries must meet (e.g., 67 
conditions per World Bank loan, on average), see Eurodad, World Bank and IMF Conditionality: A 
Development Injustice (Brussels: Eurodad, June 2006), available at 
http://www.eurodad.org/uploadstore/cms/docs/Microsoft_Word__Eurodad_World_Bank_and_IMF
_Conditionality_Report_Final_Version.pdf. However, the World Bank’s count is an average of 
12.5 conditions plus 32 nonbinding benchmarks per operation in poor (IDA) countries, with 
conditions dropping steadily since 1999 and benchmarks rising sharply since 2002. See World 
Bank, Development Policy Lending Retrospective (Washington, DC: World Bank, July 7, 2006), 
pp. 16-19, available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2006/07/14/000012009_200607
14104555/Rendered/PDF/367720rev0pdf.pdf.  
14 “In the 1980s, debt relief under the ‘Brady Plan’ helped to restore investment and growth in a 
number of middle-income developing countries. However, the debt relief plan for the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) launched by the World Bank and the IMF in 1996 has had little 
impact on either investment or growth in the recipient countries.” See Serkan Arslanalp and Peter 
Blair Henry, “Debt Relief,” NBER Working Paper #12187, April 2006, p. 1, available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/W12187.  
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GDP growth rates of the HIPC countries have not been boosted.15 Another 
assessment of the extent to which debt relief has been successful (using a 
database measuring the present value of debt relief for 62 low-income countries) 
found little evidence that debt relief has affected the level and composition of 
public spending in recipient countries, or that it has raised GDP growth, 
investment rates or the quality of policies and institutions among recipient 
countries.16 One reason may be that official debt relief has been provided in lieu 
of grants or new loans, such that there has been no significant increase in the net 
quantity of resources given to the HIPC countries.17  
 
Another explanation for disappointing results is that, since the HIPC initiative 
forces the poor countries to reallocate the resources freed from debt service in 
favor of spending on poverty reduction programs, countries must still raise the 
same amount of budgetary revenues as they did prior to receiving “relief.” 
Indeed, according to the latest estimates by the IMF and World Bank, the 29 
HIPCs that reached the decision point by mid-2006 had experienced a drop in 
debt-service payments equivalent to about 2 percent of their GDP between 1999 
and 2005. However, their poverty-reducing expenditures had increased by 
almost 3 percent of GDP during that same time period.18 In other words, HIPC 
does not deliver any cash-flow savings; it enables poor countries to increase 
                                                 
15 “Debt stock relief [under the HIPC] … has no influence on growth independent of the sample 
used.” See Ralf Hepp, “Can Debt Relief Buy Growth?,” draft, October 2005, p. 2, available at 
http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/ralfhepp/Research/Growth.pdf.  
16 Nicolas Depetris Chauvin and Aart Kraay, “What Has 100 Billion Dollars Worth of Debt Relief 
Done for Low-Income Countries?,” draft, September 2005, available at 
http://129.3.20.41/eps/if/papers/0510/0510001.pdf.  
17 See Arslanalp and Blair Henry, op. cit., pp. 9-10. 
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government spending on programs favored by donor governments – as opposed 
to saving the proceeds or spending them on programs preferred by local 
policymakers.19
 
ENTER THE BONDHOLDERS 
 
From the mid-1990s until the present, bond and equity investors, in addition to 
commercial banks and private sector suppliers, have become the dominant 
source of financing for developing countries. The rise of large-scale bond 
issuance on the part of governments and corporations in the emerging markets 
was facilitated by the existence of the Brady bonds, which were gradually sold to 
institutional investors by the commercial banks who were the original holders. 
The increasingly active ownership and trading of these Brady bonds by risk-
prone hedge funds, and later on by conservative mutual and pension funds, 
opened up a new investor base willing to take on credit exposures to middle- and 
lower-middle-income countries, in what was a bet on their potential economic 
success. As concerns the buildup of portfolio and strategic equity investments in 
the emerging markets, these flows were facilitated by the privatization of major 
utilities, industries and banks in many of the developing and transition countries, 
and by their generally welcoming attitude toward foreign investment. Even in sub-
Saharan Africa, by far the world’s poorest region, in recent years net private 
                                                                                                                                                 
18 Development Committee of the World Bank and IMF, op. cit., p. i. 
19 See Craig Burnside and Domenico Fanizza, “Hiccups for HIPCs?,” NBER Working Paper 
#10903, November 2004, pp. 1-4, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10903. 
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flows of debt and equity finance have been just as substantial as net official flows 
of foreign aid and trade credit (see Chart 2).  
 
Chart 2: External financing to sub-Saharan Africa ($ billions) 
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Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance 2006 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006), p. 
179. 
 
When various developing countries faced financial difficulties in the second half 
of the 1990s and also earlier this decade, they kept turning to the IMF for 
guidance and financial support – but afterwards their top priority was to find ways 
of restructuring their bonded debt, and not only their obligations to commercial 
banks. Because of the relative insignificance of debts falling due to official 
creditors, obtaining debt relief from the Paris Club became an option that was 
often bypassed. For example, during the Asian currency and debt crisis of 1997-
98, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea and Thailand never sought debt relief 
from their official creditors. Similarly, Mexico, Brazil and Uruguay did not turn to 
the Paris Club for any debt reprofiling in the wake of their financial troubles in 
 18
1994-95, 1998-99 and 2002-03, respectively – and neither did Turkey in 2000-02. 
These countries’ bondholders and commercial bank creditors did not even 
attempt to precondition the debt refinancing and/or forgiveness they granted five 
of these countries (Brazil, Korea, Thailand, Turkey and Uruguay) to the 
simultaneous attainment of comparable debt relief from official bilateral – never 
mind multilateral – creditors, given the large infusions of new financing on the 
part of the IMF and other official lenders.20
 
The gesture was not reciprocated by the Paris Club when dealing with those 
developing countries that did knock at its door seeking debt relief during the past 
decade. For instance, when countries as diverse as Indonesia (1998), Pakistan 
(1999), Russia (1999) and the Dominican Republic (2004) encountered financial 
difficulties and reached out to their official creditors, the debt relief they obtained 
from the Paris Club was conditioned on securing comparable relief from their 
bankers and/or bondholders. This was true even when debt to private creditors 
was small or was not yet falling due, as in the cases of Pakistan and the 
Dominican Republic. In return for a Paris Club debt rescheduling of payments 
due in 1999-2000 (along Houston terms), Pakistan was forced to rescheduling 
three Eurobonds maturing during 1999-2000 even though the amounts involved 
were relatively small. And in exchange for a Paris Club debt rescheduling of 
some arrears and payments due in 2004 (along Classic terms), the Dominican 
Republic was required to reschedule a Eurobond maturing in 2006 and another 
                                                 
20 See Nouriel Roubini and Brad Setser, Bailouts or Bail-ins? Responding to Financial Crises in 
Emerging Economies (Washington, DC: IIE, 2004), pp. 30-31 and 149-155. 
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one falling due in 2013.21 In other instances, as in those involving the Ukraine in 
1998-2000 and Ecuador in 1999-2000, it was the IMF rather than the Paris Club 
that conditioned its financial assistance to the achievement of debt relief from 
private creditors. By the time Ukraine and Ecuador came calling on the Paris 
Club (in July 2001 and September 2000, respectively), the debt restructuring 
deed had already been done.  
 
Contrary to a common assumption in G7 policymaking and academic circles at 
the start of the decade – that bondholders were too atomized and disorganized to 
help a sovereign debtor in distress restructure its debt obligations in a timely 
manner – the absence of a supranational sovereign bankruptcy mechanism did 
not delay, never mind impede, several workouts that have taken place in the past 
decade.22  
 
During the period from 1998 until 2003, the governments of Ecuador, Moldova, 
Pakistan, Russia, Ukraine, and Uruguay were all able to restructure their 
commercial bank and/or bonded debt – and did so at a progressively faster pace, 
as issuers and investors became accustomed to the mechanics of bond 
restructurings. Sovereign debtors obtained meaningful debt-service relief and 
                                                 
21 The Paris Club would later also agree to reschedule payments due in 2005. 
22 According to the then first deputy managing director of the IMF, and despite growing evidence 
to the contrary, a new approach to sovereign debt restructuring was needed because “in the 
current environment, it may be particularly difficult to secure high participation from creditors as a 
group, as individual creditors may consider that their best interests would be served by trying to 
free ride . . . These difficulties may be amplified by the prevalence of complex financial 
instruments . . . which in some cases may provide investors with incentives to hold out . . . rather 
than participating in a restructuring” [emphasis added]. See Anne O. Krueger, A New Approach to 
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even sizable debt forgiveness through the use of exchange offers, often 
accompanied by bondholder exit consents that encouraged the participation of as 
many investors as possible in take-it-or-leave-it settlements. Rather than 
amending bond covenants, the exchange offers typically entailed the debtor 
government presenting its private creditors with a menu of voluntary options, 
such as accepting new bonds for a fraction (for example, 60 percent) of the 
principal owed but paying a market interest rate, or else new bonds for the 
original principal but paying a concessional interest rate. Experience 
demonstrated that neither the threat of litigation nor actual cases of litigation 
derailed these debt relief operations, which involved everyone from large, 
institutional investors to small, retail bondholders throughout the world.23  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, April 2002), p. 8; 
available at www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/sdrm/eng/sdrm.pdf.  
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Table 1: Comparison of recent restructurings of sovereign bonds 
 
Dominican
Argentina Republic Ecuador Pakistan Russia Ukraine Uruguay
2005 2005 2000 1999 1998-2000 1998-2000 2003
Per capita income ($)* 13,920 7,150 3,363 1,826 6,592 3,841 8,280
Scope ($ billions) 81.8 1.1 6.8 0.6 31.8 3.3 5.4
Number of bonds 152 2 5 3 3 5 65
Jurisdictions involved 8 1 2 1 1 3 6
Months in arrears 41 None 10 2 18 3 None
Minimum participation set No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Recognition of interest arrears Partial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A
Principal forgiveness Yes No Yes No Yes No No
   'Haircut' on Discount bond (%) 66.3 0 40 0 37.5 0 0
Lowered coupons Yes No No Yes No Yes No
Extended maturities Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Participation rate (% of eligible) 76 97 97 95 98 95 93  
Note: "N/A" stands for not applicable. *Adjusted for purchasing power; data correspond to year(s) 
indicated of debt restructuring. 
Source: IIF, IMF, World Bank, author's calculations 
 
Since 2003, there have been four other successful sovereign debt restructurings 
involving small countries in Central America and the Caribbean: Belize, 
Dominica, Grenada and Dominican Republic. In the first three instances, 
commercial banks and bondholders have been prevailed upon to grant 
substantial debt forgiveness. In another instance of treatment that was anything 
but comparable, the Paris Club of official creditors has agreed only to a debt 
rescheduling along Classic terms for Grenada (2006), and has not been called 
upon to offer any debt relief to Belize or Dominica. In the case of the Dominican 
Republic, as mentioned previously, the country turned first to the Paris Club and 
it consented to a debt restructuring along Classic terms (2004-05) – but then the 
country was obligated to restructure payments to commercial banks and 
                                                                                                                                                 
23 For additional background information, see IMF, “Cross-Country Experience with Restructuring 
of Sovereign Debt and Restoring Debt Sustainability,” draft, August 29, 2006, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2006/082906.pdf.  
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bondholders. The multilateral agencies, for their part, have provided various 
degrees of support to these countries. For instance, Dominica and Grenada are 
sufficiently poor that they qualified for concessional lending from the IMF under 
its Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF); the Dominican Republic has 
borrowed from the Fund under its normal Stand-by Facility; and Belize has 
decided to make do without any IMF or World Bank financial support. Belize is 
therefore an interesting example of a country that is being “bailed out” exclusively 
by private-sector creditors, since official bilateral and multilateral creditors 
account for 40 percent of the government’s external debt but they have not 
provided financial support.24
 
A relatively new phenomenon, which also exemplifies the difference in the 
contribution made by private versus official creditors to the resolution of debt 
overhang problems, is the prepayment of debt that three governments (Nigeria, 
Peru and Russia) made to the Paris Club during 2005-06. In the summer of 
2005, basking in the glow of their oil bonanza, the Russian authorities decided to 
make a first prepayment of $15 billion to clear debts to official bilateral creditors, 
and a year later the country repaid the remainder of its Paris Club debt – $22 
billion in cash. In the second half of 2005, the Paris Club also accepted an offer 
made by the government of Peru to prepay up to $2 billion in maturities of its 
debt falling due during 2005-09, using the proceeds from financing obtained in 
the world capital markets.  
                                                 
24 Some new loans might be forthcoming, however, from two regional development banks. See 
IMF, “Belize: Staff Report for the 2006 Article IV Consultation,” October 5, 2006, pp. 48-53, 
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 In October 2005, the Paris Club reached a long-awaited deal with the 
government of Nigeria, whereby the country, enjoying (like Russia) a major oil-
related windfall, first cleared its payment arrears in exchange for a 33 percent 
cancellation of eligible debts; and then, in March 2006, paid other amounts 
coming due in exchange for a further cancellation of 34 percent on eligible debts, 
with Nigeria buying back remaining obligations. In total, the deal allowed the 
country to obtain debt cancellation estimated at $18 billion (including past-due 
interest), representing about 60 percent of its debt to the Paris Club, in return for 
making cash payments amounting to $12.4 billion.25 Needless to say, Paris Club 
creditors did not insist that these three countries should treat their private 
creditors in a comparable manner, and pre-pay them or otherwise compensate 
them for debt forgiveness granted in earlier years. As noted earlier, 
“comparability of treatment” is a highly discretionary, one-way street.  
 
SOME CONTRASTING INDIVIDUAL CASES 
 
The cases of Bolivia, Nicaragua, Ecuador and Argentina, with which this author 
had some involvement, bring home the difference between how private and 
official creditors have treated – and have been treated by – governments in 
serious financial trouble. These developing countries offer an interesting variety 
                                                                                                                                                 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/cr06369.pdf.  
25 Paris Club press releases dated June 15, 2005 (Peru), October 20, 2005 (Nigeria) and June 
23, 2006 (Russia), available at 
http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/press_release/page_commupresse.php. 
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because they span the range of income categories identified by the World Bank 
and other multilateral agencies: low income (Nicaragua), middle income (Bolivia 
and Ecuador), and upper income (Argentina). 
 
Bolivia: In 1988, following many years of debt-servicing difficulties, the 
government of Bolivia retired most of its commercial bank debt through a 
buyback, with creditors writing down nearly 90 percent of what the government 
owed them. In 1992, under the aegis of the Brady Plan, the remaining private 
creditors were given the option to accept a cash buyback incorporating an 84 
percent discount; a short-term bond with a similar degree of forgiveness 
convertible on maturity into local assets at a premium; or else a 30-year, 
collateralized bond bearing no interest. And a year later, in 1993, the government 
offered yet another debt buyback, funded by grants from the World Bank’s IDA 
and various donor governments, whereby virtually all remaining commercial 
creditors tendered their debts and accepted a loss of 84 percent of principal. As a 
result, Bolivia’s government debt to private creditors, which had exceeded $1 
billion back in 1980, accounting for half of its external obligations, dropped to less 
than $75 million by the mid-1990s, equivalent to not even 2 percent of total.26 
Private creditors had accepted huge, upfront losses but at least they were no 
longer responsible for Bolivia’s remaining debt woes. 
 
                                                 
26 See various issues of World Bank, Global Development Finance (Washington, DC: World 
Bank, various years). 
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Bolivia became eligible for debt relief from official bilateral and multilateral 
creditors under the original HIPC initiative in September 1998, a full decade after 
private creditors began to forgive their portion of the country’s debt. Bolivia 
obtained less than $30 million in official debt forgiveness in 1998, an amount 
which increased to almost $90 million per annum in 1999-2001, and 
subsequently, having qualified under the Enhanced HIPC initiative, to an annual 
average of about $160 million during 2002-04 – the equivalent of around 1.5 
percent of annual GDP. However, despite this steady debt relief, and largely 
because of growing budgetary deficits as a result of rising government sending, 
Bolivia’s public-sector debt increased from the equivalent of 60 percent of GDP in 
2001 to 71 percent of GDP (some $6.7 billion) in 2005. It has dropped since then 
because of substantially higher oil-related revenues – not because of official debt 
relief on the installment plan.27 The country’s external debt-service payments, 
which averaged 4.3 percent of GDP per annum during 2003-05, are expected to 
average 2.6 percent of GDP during 2006-08 after HIPC and MDRI-related 
relief.28  
 
Nicaragua: In 1995, in a buyback of commercial bank debt funded by grants 
from the World Bank’s IDA and various donor governments, most private 
creditors forgave 92 percent of what the government of Nicaragua owed them 
($1.1 billion). Foreign commercial banks had accounted for more than 15 percent 
                                                 
27 See Fundación Jubileo Bolivia, Romper la Cadena: La Deuda Pública de Bolivia, 2005, 
available at http://www.jubileobolivia.org/publicaciones/REVISTA_FINAL_si.pdf; and IMF, 
“Bolivia: Staff Report for the 2006 Article IV Consultation,” June 28, 2006, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/cr06270.pdf.  
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of the government’s external debt, but after this immediate debt forgiveness they 
represented a mere 3 percent of total. Earlier that year, official bilateral creditors 
represented by the Paris Club had agreed to cancel up to 67 percent of eligible 
debts under Naples terms, but the multilateral agencies provided no debt relief – 
except for the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI), which at 
least agreed to reschedule its loans to Nicaragua. The government’s external 
debt consequently dropped from nearly $12 billion in 1994 – by far the highest 
debt burden among developing countries, equivalent to more than 9 times GDP – 
to $6 billion by 1996 (a still excessive 375 percent of GDP).29
 
Nicaragua never became eligible for debt relief under the original HIPC initiative, 
but in the event it reached its completion point under the Enhanced HIPC in 
January 2004. The government’s external debt is presently being reduced from 
over $7 billion to about $3 billion (representing a high but tolerable 65 percent of 
GDP) thanks to debt forgiveness by bilateral and multilateral lenders. And yet, its 
external debt-service payments, which averaged 2 percent of GDP per annum 
during 2003-05, are expected to remain at that level during 2006-08 despite 
HIPC and MDRI-related relief.30 Nicaragua is also having trouble obtaining all of 
its HIPC relief because it has 23 non-Paris Club official creditors, more than 
double the average of other HIPC countries, and some of them are refusing to 
                                                                                                                                                 
28 Development Committee of the World Bank and IMF, op. cit., p. 66. 
29 See World Bank, Global Development Finance 2001 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2001), 
Volume 2, Table 1, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGDF2001/Resources/reg-
external-debt.pdf.  
30 Development Committee of the World Bank and IMF, op. cit., p. 67. 
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grant debt relief (e.g., China, Iran, Libya and Taiwan) – one of them (Libya) has 
even resorted to litigation, demanding full payment.31
 
Ecuador: In 1995, following many years of debt-servicing difficulties, the 
government of Ecuador asked private creditors to grant either principal or interest 
forgiveness as part of a comprehensive Brady Plan restructuring of nearly $8 
billion in commercial debt, and also to write off a portion of past-due interest. 
Most creditors (60 percent) accepted the choice of 30-year Discount bonds with a 
45 percent ‘haircut’ on the principal owed, while the rest acquiesced to 30-year 
bonds with highly concessional coupons delivering an equivalent amount of relief 
on an NPV basis.32 As an immediate result, Ecuador’s public external debt was 
reduced by $1.8 billion, or 17 percent of total. 
 
When Ecuador experienced acute fiscal difficulties again in 1999, the IMF made 
it clear to the government that it would not get any help from the official 
community unless it stopped paying its private creditors and obtained debt 
forgiveness – again. Ecuador thus had the dubious honor of becoming the first 
country to default on its Brady bonds, and also one of the first (at least in 
contemporary times) to default on Eurobonds. In mid-2000, the government 
proposed a complex debt relief operation whereby the various bonds in default 
were subjected to “haircuts” ranging from 19 percent (Brady Par bonds) to 47 
percent (the Eurobond maturing that year) before being exchanged for a mix of 
                                                 
31 Ibid, p. 25. 
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new Eurobonds (maturing in 2012 and 2030) and some upfront cash to help 
cover arrears. The deal as accepted resulted in a cut in the face value of 
Ecuador’s debt stock of 40%, and in cash-flow savings of about $1.5 billion over 
the first five years. In the wake of this debt relief, obligations to bilateral and 
multilateral creditors came to account for the majority (60 percent) of the 
government’s remaining external indebtedness. 
 
In sharp contrast, official bilateral and multilateral lenders have never agreed to 
any debt reduction for Ecuador. The country appealed for debt relief to the Paris 
Club time and again – in four instances during the 1980s, and also in 1992, 1994, 
2000 and 2003 – and while it was deemed to be insolvent enough to deserve 
write-offs from private creditors on the two occasions noted (1995 and 2000), it 
was considered insufficiently needy to deserve write-offs from official creditors 
even once. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Paris Club was owed about $2 
billion or one-fifth of Ecuador’s public-sector external debt, but it agreed merely to 
reschedule payments falling due in the short term according to Houston terms – 
namely, with some reduction in interest payments. The last rescheduling by 
official bilateral creditors, in mid-2003, involved stretching out a mere $81 million 
falling due in the year through March 31, 2004.33 The multilateral agencies, for 
their part, have neither rescheduled nor reduced any of the country’s debt, and 
they have provided little or no net financing to Ecuador. In fact, from 2001 to 
                                                                                                                                                 
32 Other shorter-maturity bonds were also issued, for example to cover a portion of past-due 
interest, and Ecuador paid a small amount of arrears in cash. 
33 See various Paris Club press releases relating to Ecuador available at 
http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/press_release/page_commupresse.php. 
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2004, amortization payments by Ecuador’s government to official bilateral and 
multilateral creditors actually exceeded disbursements received from those same 
creditors.34
 
Argentina: The largest and potentially most complex default the world has ever 
known was declared by the government of Argentina in December 2001. A 
punishing, unilateral restructuring offer was presented to bond investors three 
years later (January 2005), which was later accepted by 76 percent of total 
bondholders, and the government thereby obtained principal forgiveness 
estimated at 56% of affected debt and managed to inflict NPV losses of around 
75%. Eligible for the massive bond exchange were 152 different securities 
amounting to a total of $82 billion, including a relatively small amount of past-due 
interest (accrued through end-2001) – because interest arrears after that point 
were not recognized. Eleven new securities were offered to participating 
investors, and they ranged from Par bonds which were not subject to a haircut on 
nominal principal but paid very little interest and had a final maturity of 35 years, 
to Discount bonds with a principal reduction of 66 percent and better terms 
otherwise, designed to meet out approximately equal NPV losses.35
 
Argentina’s insistence on such massive debt relief is without precedent in its own 
checkered financial history, and also in comparison with the debt relief obtained 
                                                 
34 See IMF, “Ecuador: First Review Under the Standby Arrangement…,” July 23, 2003, p. 22, 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr03248.pdf; and “Ecuador: Staff Report 
for the 2005 Article IV Consultation,” January 4, 2006, p. 34, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/cr0698.pdf. 
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by other upper-middle-income countries – the likes of Chile, Mexico, South Africa 
or Turkey – in decades past. It can only be compared with the large-scale relief 
obtained by much poorer countries such as Bolivia or Nicaragua, as detailed 
above, or by other HIPCs. To add insult to injury, Argentina’s fiscal performance 
and international reserves, and most economic and social indicators, have fully 
recovered from their low point in 2001-02.36 The government has remained 
current in its obligations to the multilateral lending agencies, even though they 
have greatly diminished their disbursements to the country. It has also prepaid all 
of its debt to the IMF: a whopping, $10 billion payment made at the end of 2005, 
following principal payments of about $13 billion made earlier. And while 
Argentina has been in default to the bilateral agencies represented by the Paris 
Club (for about $4.5 billion, including interest arrears, as of mid-2006), all that the 
government is reportedly expecting is an eventual rescheduling under Classic 
terms.37
 
Arguably, Argentina’s bondholders could have fared much better if official 
bilateral and multilateral creditors, led by the United States and other G7 
governments, had stood up to this rogue sovereign debtor and had insisted on 
fair treatment for private creditors. Instead, they essentially sided with Argentina, 
or at best turned a blind eye to its aggressive designs, thereby encouraging the 
                                                                                                                                                 
35 See IMF, “Cross-Country Experience…,” op. cit., pp. 12, 14 and 48-49. 
36 See IMF, “IMF Executive Board Concludes 2006 Article IV Consultation with Argentina,” August 
9, 2006, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2006/pn0693.htm. 
37 Argentina has already offered to pay the government of Spain the nearly $1 billion it owes on 
condition that the Spanish government is willing to stretch out the payment through 2012. See 
Argentina’s Clarín newspaper, “Argentina pagará a España toda su deuda antes del 2012,” 
November 5, 2006, available at http://www.clarin.com/diario/2006/11/05/elpais/p-00401.htm.  
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authorities in Buenos Aires to make mincemeat out of its bondholders. To begin 
with, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the Basle-based central banks’ 
central bank, allowed itself to be used as a safe harbor for Argentina’s hard-
currency assets, because while on deposit there they are out of attachment 
range from bondholders who have obtained judgments against the government in 
various courts. Second, the multilateral lending agencies were actually 
supportive of Argentina via a series of new loans granted by the IMF, the World 
Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, especially during 2003 and the 
first half of 2004. This despite the fact that the IMF has had a policy of lending to 
a government in default only when it is pursuing “appropriate policies” and when 
it is making “a good faith effort to reach a collaborative agreement with its 
creditors.”38
 
Argentina also won an important gesture of political support in the form of amicus 
curiae briefs filed by the US government and the Federal Reserve in US courts in 
January 2004. The government in Buenos Aires succeeded in persuading US 
authorities that the international payments system was at risk from the potential 
application of a legal clause (pari passu) which had been used by creditors 
against the governments of Peru and Nicaragua. And then, while Argentina was 
crafting its request for debt forgiveness (during 2004), the IMF declined to insist 
upon overwhelming acceptance of whatever debt restructuring proposal the 
country would put forth to its creditors. Doing so would not have been unusual for 
                                                 
38 See IMF, “IMF Board Discusses the Good-Faith Criterion under the Fund Policy on Lending 
into Arrears to Private Creditors,” September 24, 2002, available at 
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the Fund, and it would have put pressure on Buenos Aires to come up with a less 
punishing proposal, or to have added some last minute “sweeteners” to maximize 
bondholder acceptance.39
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In sum, institutional and retail bondholders, as well as commercial and 
investment banks in the United States, Canada, Europe and Japan, should be 
recognized for their very good track record in dealing with sovereign debt 
problems. They have helped to resolve expeditiously and even generously – and 
mostly unconditionally – the multiple cases of sovereign overindebtedness in 
which they have been involved in various parts of the world. The official 
development community cannot make a similar claim. Indeed, private creditors 
have been much more progressive, flexible, and quick in dealing with sovereign 
insolvency situations than have been official lenders.  
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2002/pn02107.htm.  
39 See Porzecanski, op. cit, pp. 327-331. 
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